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The Eect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
By Eric French and Jae Song
This paper exploits the eectively random assignment of judges to
disability insurance cases to estimate the causal impact of Disabil-
ity Insurance receipt on labor supply. We nd that benet receipt
reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage points three years
after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is
smaller for older people, college graduates, and those with men-
tal illness. OLS and instrumental variables estimates are similar.
Furthermore, over 60 percent of those denied benets by an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge are subsequently allowed benets within 10
years, showing that most applicants apply, re-apply, and appeal
until they get benets.
This paper presents new evidence on the eect of Disability Insurance (DI)/Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) receipt on labor supply. We compare the earnings patterns of indi-
viduals who applied for and received disability insurance benets to the earnings patterns of
those who applied for benets but were denied.
Relative to Bound's (1989) classic study on earnings of rejected DI applicants, we make
the following key improvement. We address the fact that those who are denied benets are
potentially dierent than those who are allowed. Using Social Security administrative data,
we exploit the assignment of DI cases to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), an assignment
which is essentially random. We document large dierences in allowance rates across judges,
and show that these dierences are unrelated to the health or earnings potential of DI ap-
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plicants. Using instrumental variables procedures, we use judge specic allowance rates to
predict allowance of individual cases. We then use predicted allowance to estimate the eect
of allowance on labor supply.
We nd that three years after assignment to an ALJ, DI benet allowance reduces earnings
$4,059 per year and labor force participation 26 percentage points. As it turns out, our
estimates are not very sensitive to accounting for the fact that those who are denied benets
are potentially dierent than those who are allowed: instrumental variables estimates are
very close to OLS estimates for those assigned to an ALJ. These estimates imply a high
labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage. The earnings and participation
elasticities are 1.8 and 1.5, respectively.
However, many initially-denied DI applicants appeal or re-apply. In fact, we nd that
40 percent of applicants who are denied benets by an ALJ are eventually allowed benets
within three years. Furthermore, 40 percent of those not allowed benets three years after
an assignment to an ALJ are allowed benets within 10 years of assignment. In order to be
allowed benets, the applicant cannot earn above a small amount. As a result, few applicants
work during the appeal process, even though they are currently not receiving benets. This
has an important impact on our estimated eects. When we measure earnings and DI benet
allowance ve years after assignment to an ALJ, rather than three, we nd that DI allowance
reduces earnings $4,915 per year, rather than $4,059.
Furthermore, we estimate labor supply responses for dierent subgroups of the population.
We identify many subgroups of the population whose labor supply is not sensitive to benet
receipt, such as those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. Because
we have the population of DI applicants whose case was heard by a judge, we obtain precise
estimates of the labor supply responses, even for these narrow subgroups of the population.
Using a Marginal Treatment Eects approach, we nd that marginal applicants handled
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE THE EFFECT OF DISABILITY INSURANCE RECEIPT ON LABOR SUPPLY 3
by stricter judges (who allow benets to relatively few applicants) have slightly smaller labor
supply responses than the marginal applicants heard by lenient judges. This is consistent
with the view that the marginal applicant handled by a strict judge is slightly less able to
work than the marginal case handled by a more lenient judge. The marginal case heard by
a stricter judge is, however, slightly more likely to get benets in the future. This suggests
that these strict judges delay benet receipt rather than deny benet receipt.
Section 1 gives a literature review, section 2 describes the DI system, section 3 describes
our estimation methods, section 4 shows data, section 5 reports basic estimates, and section
6 concludes.
I. Literature Review
Disability Insurance is one of America's largest social insurance programs. In 2005, 4.1
percent of men ages 25-64 were receiving DI benets (Autor and Duggan 2006). Furthermore,
many disabled individuals with low income receive Supplemental Security Income benets.
Most DI and SSI beneciaries also receive health insurance benets through Medicare (for
DI beneciaries) or Medicaid (for SSI beneciaries). The combined cost of these programs
was $428 billion in 2008 (Livermore, Stapelton, and O'Toole 2011), making these programs
several times more expensive than unemployment insurance. These rapidly rising costs have
generated many policy proposals to reform the system (Autor and Duggan 2010, Burkhauser
and Daly 2011).
DI is often cited as a major cause of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 55-64. In
order to better understand the labor supply eects of DI, Bound (1989) compared earnings
patterns of individuals who applied for and received DI benets to those who applied for
benets but were denied. He found that those who were allowed benets were less likely to
work than those who were denied, but the eect was modest. Even those who were denied
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benets had participation rates of less than 50 percent after denial of benets. The dierence
in participation rates of those allowed versus denied was 34 percentage points. Thus, Bound
inferred that at most 50 percent of rejected male applicants during the 1970s would have
worked were it not for the availability of disability benets. These estimates imply that DI
is responsible for well under half of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 55-64 over
the 1970s and 1980s.
Von Watcher, Song, and Manchester (2011) nd that these labor supply responses have
if anything grown over time because applicants are now younger and have potentially less
severe health impairments. Thus the labor supply response to DI receipt might be bigger now
than during our sample from the 1990s. Consistent with Von Watcher, Song, and Manchester
(2011), Duggan and Imberman (2008) point out that 13.5 percent of DI awards in 1982-83
were for mental disorders, while in 2002-03 it was 25.7 percent. Nevertheless, Bound's original
estimate is still very close to the most recent OLS estimates. For example, Bound's estimate
was 0.34. Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2011) use recent administrative data, and nd that
the estimate is .35. It is worth noting that our OLS estimates are .27, smaller than those of
Bound (1989), Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2011) and Von Watcher, Song, and Manchester
(2011). The reason for this is that they use estimates from the initial stage, whereas we use
estimates from the ALJ stage.
Parsons (1991) and Bound (1989, 1991) discuss three key criticisms of Bound's approach.
First, those who are denied benets are dierent than those who are allowed. Dierences in
labor supply between those denied and allowed are partly due to the eect of DI, but also
partly due to the two groups having dierent propensities to work, even when receiving the
same DI treatment. People whose applications were denied are likely to be in better health,
which, all else equal, should make them more likely to work, which is what Bound (1989)
argued. However, those who are denied benets also tend to have very intermittent work
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histories (Lahiri, Song, and Wixon 2008), suggesting that their non-health characteristics
make them less likely to work. For this reason, OLS might be biased up or down. As a result,
it is not clear whether those who are denied are more or less likely to work in the absence of
benets and whether OLS overstates or understates the work disincentive eects of DI.
It is this problem that our study addresses. Our identication approach compares those
who are denied benets to those who are otherwise similar but are allowed benets. Our
approach complements the approach of Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008). They use the fact
that in many cases, an individual aged 54 applying for benets would be denied, although the
same individual at age 55 would be allowed. Our estimated labor supply eects are similar
to Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008). However, we add to their analysis by providing larger
sample sizes. This allows for more precise estimates. It also allows us to document how
the responsiveness of labor supply varies with demographics, because we can obtain precise
estimates for narrow subgroups.
Our estimated eects are also similar to Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2011), who use
assignment of disability examiners at the initial stage of the DI application process as a
source of variation in allowance rates. This paper makes three contributions relative to that
paper. The rst is that judges are assigned to cases on a rotational basis, which makes the
assignment process random for all practical purposes, whereas examiners at the initial stage
may specialize. Thus our source of variation is more clearly exogenous. Second, we obtain
more precise estimates, allowing us to document how the responsiveness of labor supply varies
with demographics. Third, our data includes earnings and the share of individuals who are
allowed or are appealing up to 10 years after the ALJ allowance decision, whereas they have
data only on earnings and the share working, and only up to three years after an initial
allowance decision. This is important because we nd that 40 percent of those not allowed
benets three years after an assignment to an ALJ are allowed benets within 10 years of
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assignment.
Our paper, Van der Klaauw (2008) and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2011) all obtain
identication at dierent stages of the adjudication process, and thus our estimated eects
correspond to dierent pools of applicants. Thus the three studies are of independent interest.
For example, the disparities in allowance rates across ALJs has received a great deal of
attention in policy circles (Social Security Advisory Board, 2006), legal studies (Taylor, 2007),
and the popular press (Paletta, 2011). Despite the dierences between our paper, Chen and
Van der Klaauw (2008), and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2011), all three papers produce
similar results and reinforce each other's ndings.
The second criticism of Bound's approach is that many individuals who are denied continue
to appeal the denial. In order to be deemed eligible for benets, the individual cannot work
while appealing the denial. Thus, many of those who are denied do not work in order to
increase the chances of successful appeal. If the option to appeal had not existed, more of
these individuals might have returned to the labor force. We partly address this problem by
estimating the labor supply response to whether the individual was allowed benets three
years after assignment to a judge, although we show that many re-apply and appeal well
after three years. We provide new evidence on the share of denied individuals who appeal
and subsequently receive benets.1
Third, in order to apply for benets, the individual must be out of the labor force for a
period of time. For example, the individual can only work a very limited amount in the ve
months before applying for benets and during the time that they are appealing a denial.
During that period, human capital may depreciate (Autor et al. (2011)). Thus the individual
may not be able to return to her previous job, even if she is healthy. In other words, the very
1Understanding subsequent allowance and appeal is also an important input into dynamic models of DI application
and receipt, such as Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (2010), Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2011), Low and
Pistaferri (2011).
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act of applying for benets reduces ability to work.2 Our study does not address this issue.
II. The Disability Insurance System
A. Labor Supply Incentives
This section shows that that the DI beciaries face strong work disincentives. Both income
eects (through the value of the disability benet) and substitution eects (beneciaries will
lose benets if they earn above the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) level) indicate that
DI should reduce labor supply. If an applicant is allowed DI benets, the dollar amount of
benets depends on previous labor earnings.
Disabled worker benets averaged $1,130 per month among DI beneciaries in 2013 (So-
cial Security Administration, 2013). Because the benet schedule is progressive, disability
benets replace 60 percent and 40 percent of previous labor income for those at the 10th and
50th percentile of the earnings distribution, respectively (Autor and Duggan 2006).3 Those
receiving benets can earn up to the SGA level, which was $500 per month (in current dol-
lars) during the 1990s and $1,040 per month in 2013. Those earning more than this amount
for more than a nine month Trial Work Period lose their benets.
Furthermore, DI benets likely reduce labor supply through a third channel { Medicare
eligibility. Individuals receiving DI benets are eligible for Medicare after a two year wait-
ing period. Medicare largely eliminates the value of employer-provided health insurance.
For those working at a rms providing health insurance, Medicare eliminates an important
work incentive (French and Jones, 2011). Livermore, Stapelton, and O'Toole (2011) show
that federal and state governments spend more on health care than on cash benets for the
2Moore (2012) examines the health and employment eects of the removal of DI benets for those who were claiming
benets as a result of an alcohol or drug addiction. Interestingly, Moore nds that among those losing benets, those
receiving DI benets for 5 years are at least as likely to return to work as those receiving benets for 1 year. This
suggests that many individuals can return to work, even after a long absence from the labor force.
3The more relevant replacement rate is the benet amount relative to what she could earn in the labor market after
application. This replacement rate is likely higher than 60-40 percent because potential earnings of applicants are likely
lower after application.
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disabled.
Disabled individuals with especially weak earnings histories and low asset levels are eligible
for a related program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI benets are not a
function of previous labor income. The Federal Maximum SSI benet level was $386 per
month in 1990 and $710 in 2013. Some states supplement this benet. Benets are reduced
by 50 cents for every dollar of earnings above a small disregard level. Individuals drawing
SSI may also be immediately eligible for Medicaid, the government provided health insurance
program for the poor (Rupp and Riley 2011). Many people draw both DI and SSI benets
concurrently.
Relatively few people lose disability benets for reasons other than death.4 For example, of
7.1 million individuals (DI worker beneciaries) drawing DI benets in 2007, 0.5 percent had
benets terminated because they earned above the SGA level for an extended period of time
in 2007. Another 0.3 percent had benets terminated because they were deemed medically
able to work after a continuing disability review, which is a periodic review of the health of
DI beneciaries (Social Security Administration, 2007).5
The disability allowance decision is high stakes. If the individual is allowed benets, that
individual is typically given disability benets until the normal retirement age (age 65 during
the 1990s and now 66), when these benets are converted into Social Security benets. If an
individual began receiving the the average benet ($1,004 per month) at age 50, he would
receive these benets until age 65. Thus these benets would amount to about 15 years  12
months  $1,004= $181,000 over the course of his life. This would be in addition to Medicare
benets.
4DI benets are converted into retiree benets once the beneciary turns the normal retirement age. The statistics
above are for DI benets before the conversion to retiree benets.
5Longitudinal statistics show that the percentage of new beneciaries who eventually leave for work, at least tem-
porarily, is several times higher (Liu and Stapleton(2011)). Nevertheless, the share leaving for work is smaller than the
share leaving because of death.
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B. Determining Eligibility for DI benets
An individual is deemed eligible for benets if they have met certain work requirements
and if they are deemed medically disabled. Although the exact algorithm is complex (see Hu
et al. 2001, Benitez-Silva et al. 1999, for details), one of two conditions must be met for the
individual to be deemed disabled.
The rst condition is \listed impairment". Individuals that meet one of over 100 specic
listed impairments are given immediate benets. Examples include statutory blindness (i.e.,
corrected vision of 20/200 or worse in the better eye) and multiple sclerosis.6
The second condition is inability to perform either past work or other work. This condition
involves a combination of medical impairment and vocational factors such as education, work
experience, and age. These cases can be especially dicult to evaluate. Myers (1993), a
former Social Security Administration Deputy Commissioner, points out that \if a worker has
a disability so severe that he or she can do only sedentary work, then disability is presumed
in the case where the person is aged 55 and older, has less than a high school education,
and has worked only in unskilled jobs, but this is not so presumed in the case of a similar
young worker. Clearly, borderline cases arise frequently and are dicult to adjudicate in an
equitable manner!"
The disability determination process is a multi-step process. Figure 1 shows the share of
applicants who are allowed at dierent steps during our sample period (described in detail in
Section 4 and Appendix A). After an initial waiting period of ve months, DI applicants have
their case reviewed by a Disability Determination Service review board. Figure 1 shows that
39 percent of applicants are allowed and 61 percent are denied at this stage. At this stage the
most clear-cut cases are allowed, such as those with a listed impairment. Cases that are more
6Note that many people who meet the listings do, in fact, work. For example, anybody who is permanently deaf,
blind, or unable to walk would meet the listings, but many such individuals do work.
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Figure 1. : Allowance at different stages of the applications and appeals process.
dicult to judge (such as musculoskeletal problems) are usually denied at this stage.7 About
half of all applicants denied for medical reasons appeal at the disability determination service
reconsideration stage. About 10 percent of those that appeal are allowed benets at this stage
(Social Security Administration, 2008). Sixty days after the disability determination service
decision, a DI appeal can be requested. DI appeals are reviewed in court by Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs) after a delay of about one year.8 14 percent of all initial claims, or 59
percent of all claims that are appealed, are allowed at the ALJ level.9 If the case is denied at
the ALJ level, the applicant can then appeal to the Appeals Council level. If the applicant is
denied at this level, she can then appeal after 60 days at the Federal Court level. However,
Figure 1 shows that appeals at the higher levels are rarely successful: less than 2 percent of
all initial claimants receive benets at the Appeals Council or Federal Court level. Lastly,
7At each point in time we include those who are alive and younger than 65. Thus for 10 years after ling, our sample
includes those who were under 55 at the time of ling. Those under 55 at the time of ling have lower allowance rates:
their initial allowance rate is 29 percent instead of the full sample initial allowance rate of 39 percent.
8Judges can make one of three decisions: allowed, denied, or remand. A \remand" is a request for more information
from the disability determination service. Our measure of \allowed" is the nal determination at the ALJ stage, and
thus includes the nal decision on remands.
9The full allowance rate at this stage is slightly higher than 59 percent. Our 59 percent allowance rate is for our
estimation sample, which drops pre-reviewed cases that have higher allowance rates.
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denied applicants can end their appeal and re-apply for benets. The last line on Figure 1
includes those who re-apply for benets. Another 7 percent of all initial claims are eventually
allowed benets through a re-application. 33 percent do not get benets at any stage after
10 years. Figure A1 in the appendix shows that most who do not get benets after a few
years end their appeals. However, 10 years after initially claiming, 6 percent are still in the
process of appealing or re-applying.
Because we identify the causal eect of DI on labor supply using variation at the ALJ level,
the estimated eect applies only to marginal cases. The least healthy individuals, such as
those with listed impairments, will almost always be allowed at the Disability Determination
Service stage. The healthiest individuals will almost always be denied by every judge and on
every appeal. Thus our results may not be fully generalizable to all DI applicants. However,
these marginal cases are of great interest, because these are the individuals most likely to be
aected by changes in the leniency of the appeals level of the DI system.
C. Assignment of DI cases to judges
Judicial independence means that judges have a great deal of latitude to determine eligi-
bility (Taylor, 2007). As a result, two dierent judges can have very dierent allowance rates
even though their caseloads are very similar.
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are assigned to appeals cases on a rotational basis, with
the oldest cases receiving priority at each hearing oce.10 Thus, the oldest case is given to
the judge who most recently nished a case. Therefore, conditional on applying at a given
10Title 5, Part III, Subpart B, Chapter 31, Subchapter I, Section 3105 of the US Code states that \Administrative
law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable" (United States, 2007). The Social Security
Administration's Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) Volume I Chapter 2 Section 1-55 states
that \the Hearing Oce Chief Administrative Law Judge generally assigns cases to ALJs from the master docket on a
rotational basis, with the earliest (i.e., oldest) Request for Hearing receiving priority." (Social Security Administration,
2009). HALLEX gives 11 exceptions to this rule. For example, the exceptions include \critical cases", such as individuals
with terminal conditions and military service personnel, as well as remand cases. These cases are expedited and reviewed
by Senior Attorneys. If there is a clear cut decision to be made, then the Senior Attorney will make the decision without
a hearing. If the case is not clear cut, then the case is put back in the master docket and is assigned to a judge in
rotation. Fortunately we can identify cases that were decided without a hearing and we delete them from our sample.
Our analysis focuses on the remaining cases where there was a hearing.
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oce at a given point in time, the initial assignment of cases to judges is \essentially random"
(Social Security Advisory Board, 2006). Judges do not get to pick the cases they handle.
Judges are not assigned cases based on the expertise of the judge. Furthermore, an individual
cannot choose an alternate judge after being assigned a judge.
The initially assigned judge is not necessarily the judge who decides the case. Paletta
(2011) documents a judge who took assigned cases from other judges and made decisions on
those cases. Thus the cases were not randomly assigned to the deciding judge.11 Fortunately,
however, we have information on the assigned judge in addition to the deciding judge. Al-
though the deciding judge is not necessarily randomly assigned, the initially assigned judge
is. We use the initial assignment to a judge as our source of exogenous variation. As it turns
out, the initially assigned judge is the same as the deciding judge in 96 percent of all cases.
The assigned judge is for all practical purposes randomly assigned conditional on hearing
oce and day. However, individuals are not randomly assigned to hearing oces. The zip
code in which a person lives determines the hearing oce to which they are assigned. The
characteristics of applicants vary by location (e.g., black lung disease is more common near
mining towns) as well as across time (e.g., the share of DI applicants listing mental illness
as the main health problem has risen over time). For this reason we condition explicitly on
hearing oce and day in the estimations below. In doing so, we exploit only within hearing
oce-day variation in judge level leniency.
III. Estimating Equations
In order to estimate the eect of DI allowance on earnings and labor force participation,
we use a two-step procedure. In the rst step we generate an instrumental variable that is a
11Furthermore, an individual can potentially reject the assigned judge. For example, if an individual misses her court
case, she may be reassigned to a dierent judge. Another possibility is that for some cases in remote areas, cases are
held via video conference where the judge and claimant are not in the same room. Claimants can demand that the
judge be present at a hearing, and thus the judge must travel to the claimant. Some judges refuse to travel, and thus
another judge will be reassigned to the case.
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measure of judge leniency. Conditional on the hearing oce and time, this variable is corre-
lated with the probability of allowance, but is independent of health, ability, or preferences
for work. In the second step we use instrumental variables procedures to estimate the eect
of DI on earnings, participation, appeals, and subsequent allowance.
A. Basic Specication
Our basic estimating approach is a modied instrumental variables regression where in a
rst stage we estimate
Ait = jit +XiAt + eit:(1)
where Ait is a 0-1 indicator equal to 1 if individual i is allowed benets at time t, ji is a full
set of judge indicator variables equal to 1 if judge j heard individual i's case, and Xi is a full
set of hearing oce-day indicators (equal 1 if individual i's case is assigned to that hearing
oce-day pair). The allowance rate and estimated parameters depend on time since many
individuals initially denied benets are subsequently allowed.
For the second stage we adopt the random coecients model of Bjorklund and Mott
(1987):
yi = Aiti +Xiy + ui(2)
where yi is either earnings, participation, appeals or allowance at time  . We allow for time
  t so that we can observe the eect of time t allowance on time  outcomes. We allow for
heterogeneity in the parameter i to capture heterogeneity in the eect of benet receipt
on earnings, appeals, and allowance, both across individuals and over time. We allow the
variables ui and i to be potentially correlated with Ait, and with each other.
12 Ideally we
12The residual ui is potentially correlated with Ait because those allowed benets potentially have low earnings
potential. Furthermore, i is potentially correlated with Ait because more disabled people are unlikely to work, even
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would be able to identify the entire distribution of i , although this is not possible. Below
we describe what is identied given our data.
B. Estimating Equations
When estimating equation (2) we are confronted with three concerns. First, we wish to
allow for heterogeneity in the parameter i . Second, we have 1,497 judges in our sample,
each of whom is a potential instrument. IV estimators can suer from small sample bias when
both the number of instruments and the number of observations is large (e.g., Hausman et
al. (2009)). Third, we have over 200,000 hearing oce-day interactions in the covariate set
Xi. To solve these three concerns, we use Doyle's (2007) estimation procedure.
First, we de-mean variables by hearing oce and day, and construct variables eAit = Ait  
Ait, eyi = yi yi where Ait and yi are the mean values of Ait; yi conditional on the hearing
oce and on the day that case i was assigned. Second, we create our instrumental variable
(which we refer to as the judge allowance dierential), which is:
eji^1; i = 1Nj   1 X
s2J;s 6=i
As1  As1(3)
where Nj is the number of cases heard by judge ji over the sample period, J is the set of
cases heard by judge ji, As1 is the mean allowance rate by ALJs at case s's hearing oce
on the day case s was heard. This instrument is equivalent to the predicted allowance rate
from OLS estimation of equation (1) where Ai1 (the ALJ decision) is the dependent variable,
controlling for a full set of hearing oce time interactions, and leaving observation i out, as
in a jackknife estimator. Thus our instrument compares each decision with the corresponding
oce-day average probability to measure judge leniency. To the extent that a judge is more
(less) lenient than other judges making decisions in that same oce-day pair, the judge
when they get the benet. Finally, ui and i are potentially correlated with each other since unhealthy individuals
have lower earnings, whether or not they are allowed benets.
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allowance dierential (which by denition does not vary within judge over time) will be
positive (negative).
Because we remove observation i, the estimated parameter ^1; i is independent of eit or
ui , even in a small sample. Third, we estimate the equations
eAit = teji^1; i + it;(4)
eyi =  beAit + eui(5)
jointly using two stage least squares.
Given the above assumptions, Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and French and Taber
(2011) point out that this procedure identies a weighted average of i for the set of indi-
viduals aected by the instrument if three conditions are met. First, if judges are randomly
assigned to cases, conditional on date and hearing oce, then assignment satises the \in-
dependence assumption". Second, if judges dier only in leniency and rank applicants the
same with respect to severity, then Imbens and Angrist's (1994) \monotonicity assumption"
is satised. The monotonicity assumption implies that a case allowed by a strict judge will
always be allowed by a lenient one.13 Third, we assume that the instrument causes varia-
tion in allowance rates, sometimes known as the rank or existence condition. Sections V.A
and V.B provide evidence on the extent to which the independence, monotonicity, and rank
assumptions hold.14
13Montonicity would not hold under the following scenario. Suppose one judge gives weight to education, skills,
and social support system, and might allow somebody with low levels of these attributes and but not a serious medical
condition, while denying somebody with a demonstrably more severe medical condition but high levels of these attributes.
If another judge used medical evidence alone she might ip these decisions, which would violate the monotonicity
assumption.
14More formally, we are assuming that allowance follows
Ait = 1fgt(Zi)  Vi > 0g(6)
where Zi = (ji;Xi). The residual Vi can be thought of as the lack of severity of disability observed by the judge (but
not by the econometrician). Equation (6) implies that all judges observe the same signal of disability Vi but dier in
the level of severity necessary to be allowed benets gt(Zi). We assume Vi is independent of ji and Xi, sometimes
called the independence assumption. The latent variable framework gives rise to the monotonicity assumption. The
rank condition is that plim bAit = Pr(Ait = 1jZi) is a non-trivial function of Zi. Equation (6) is not identied because
a monotonic transformation of both g(:) and Vi delivers the same choice probabilities. As a normalization, we assume
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C. Marginal Treatment Eects
Section V.F presents estimated Marginal Treatment Eects (MTEs), which is the participa-
tion or earnings response for the individuals whose allowance decision is aected by changing
the instrument. We estimate the equations
eAit = KX
k=1
kt(eji^1; i)k + it;(7)
eyi = KX
k=1
'k
^
(
beAit)k + i(8)
where
beAit is the predicted value of eAit from equation (7), and \e" represents a de-meaned
variable, e.g.,
g^eAitk = e^Aitk   e^Aitk. As shown by Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and
French and Taber (2010), as well as appendix C, the estimated MTE is
KX
k=1
k'k
^
(
beAit)k 1 = E^[i jallowed if beAit  at; not allowed if beAit < at; ](9)
where at is a particular realization of the (de-meaned) allowance rate. Equation (9) shows that
the MTE is the mean value of i for those who would be allowed if the value if their assigned
judge allowed slightly higher than a share at of cases, and would be denied if assigned to a
judge allowing slightly lower than a share at of cases. This value of at can also be interpreted
as the (lack of) judge-observed severity of the case. As at increases, the instrument aects
individuals with lower levels of severity. We estimate ^1; i from equation (3) as before, then
estimate equations (7) and (8). The polynomials allow for the fact the Heckman, Urzua,
and Vytlacil (2006) experiment with dierent approaches to estimating the MTE, such as
local polynomial smoothers. They nd that the polynomial approach works about as well
as other procedures. Our Monte Carlo simulations suggest there is very little bias when
that Vi is distributed uniformly. Furthermore, as a functional form assumption we assume that g(:) is linear in ji and
Xi so that we can estimate equation (6) using the regression function in equation (1).
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE THE EFFECT OF DISABILITY INSURANCE RECEIPT ON LABOR SUPPLY 17
using polynomials. Furthermore, the polynomial procedure is computationally feasible when
allowing for large numbers of covariates, such as a full set of hearing oce-day interactions.
Appendix C provides more details on interpretation and estimation of the MTE.
IV. Data
Our initial sample is the universe of individuals who appealed either a DI or SSI bene-
t denial, and were assigned to an ALJ during the years 1990-1999. Using Social Security
Numbers, we match together data from the SSA 831 le, the Oce of Hearings and Ap-
peals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing Oce Tracking System (HOTS), the
Appeals Council Automated Processing System (ACAPS), the Litigation Overview Tracking
System (LOTS), the Master Earnings le (MEF), and the Numerical Identication le (NU-
MIDENT). These data are described in greater detail in the appendix. To the best of our
knowledge, neither the OHACCS, HOTS, ACAPS, nor the LOTS datasets have been used
for research purposes before. We match in earnings, reapplications and appeals data from 11
years prior to 10 years following assignment to a judge. Thus our earnings and appeals data
run from 1979 to 2009.
We drop all observations heard by a judge who heard less than 50 cases during the sample
period. We also drop cases with missing education information. Table A1 in Appendix A
presents more details on sample selection criteria and table A2 presents mean age, race,
earnings histories, and health of individuals in our estimation sample. Our main estimation
sample has 1,779,825 DI cases, heard by 1,497 judges, with a mean allowance rate at the
ALJ stage of 64.5 percent. Because many of those denied by an ALJ appeal or re-apply for
benets, the allowance rate three years after assignment is 76.9 percent. All dollar amounts
listed below are in 2006 dollars, deated by the CPI.
These cases were heard at 227 dierent hearing oces (including temporary remote sites)
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over our 10 year sample period. Cases were heard on 217,663 hearing oce-day pairs that
our procedure must account for. Thus on an average 1; 779; 825=217; 748 = 8:2 cases were
heard at each hearing oce-day pair. Although 217,663 hearing oce-day xed-eects is a
large number to account for, recall that consistency in xed eects estimators depends on the
number of observations going to innity, not the number of observations per xed eect going
to innity. A non-trivial number of cases ( 242,908, or 13.7 percent of all cases) were heard
when there was only a single judge at the hearing oce on that day. Given that identication
in our instrumental variables estimation comes from across judge variation in allowance rates
within hearing oce-day pairs, these observations do not contribute any identifying variation.
Nevertheless, the other observations contribute useful identifying information, as the results
below show.
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Figure 2. : Allowance rate of ALJs, de-meaned, and de-meaned by hearing office and day.
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Figure 2 plots the distribution of judge specic allowance rates, both unconditional (left
panel) and also conditional on hearing oce-day (right panel). Specically, the left panel
plots the distribution of average allowance rates of dierent judges over the sample period.
The right panel plots the judge allowance rate de-meaned by hearing oce and day (weighted
by the number of cases heard); it is thus the histogram of our instrumental variable. Figure
2 shows that there is less variation in allowance rates after conditioning on hearing oce
and day; one standard deviation in the unconditional judge allowance rate is 0.153, whereas
conditional on hearing oce and day it is 0.0659 (when weighted by the number of cases
handled by the judge). This means that being assigned to a judge one standard deviation
more lenient than the average at her oce increases the probability of allowance at the ALJ
stage by 6.59 percentage points. Thus conditioning on hearing oce and day removes a non-
trivial share of variation in judge allowance rates, but much of the variation is within hearing
oce and day.
V. Results
A. Establishing the validity of the randomization
In previous sections we claimed that the assignment of cases to judges is random, conditional
on hearing oce and day. Random assignment implies that we cannot predict the judge using
observable characteristics of the judge's caseload. Table 1 presents tests of this hypothesis.
First we consider which variables predict allowance. Column 1 of Table 1 presents estimates
from a regression of an allowance indicator (de-meaned by hearing oce and day) on the
age, race, earnings histories, and health conditions of individuals in our estimation sample.
Women, older individuals, whites, those with strong attachment to the labor market, high
earners, those represented by a lawyer, and those who did not complete high school are more
likely to be allowed benets. Column 2 presents t statistics (all standard errors throughout
are clustered by judge). It shows that these dierences are highly statistically signicant.
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The R2 shows that the covariates explain 3.9 percent of the variation in allowance rates.
Our instrumental variable is the judge allowance dierential, ji^1; i, de-meaned by hear-
ing oce and day. Column 3 presents estimates from a regression of the judge allowance
dierential on covariates. Column 4 provides t   statistics. Of the 22 covariates, two have
coecients that are statistically dierent than 0 at the 95 percent level. Sex, age, race, pre-
vious earnings, past labor market participation, an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is
a DI (but not SSI) applicant, an indicator for whether the case is represented by a lawyer,
and education all have little explanatory power for whether or not the case was assigned to a
lenient judge. All the estimated coecients are small in comparison to the coecients on the
same variables in the allowance equation. The only statistically signicant dierences are for
mental disorders and neoplasms. Those with mental disorders and neoplasms are assigned
to judges who have 0.16 percent lower allowance rates than average. These coecients are
small, especially in comparison to the coecients on the same variables in the allowance equa-
tion. The R2 shows that the covariates explain 0.02 percent of the variation in judge specic
allowance rates. Thus there is little evidence against the hypothesis of random assignment.
Random assignment satises the independence assumption described in section III.A. The
next section provides some evidence on whether the rank and monotonicity conditions hold.
B. First Stage Estimates
Column 1 of table 2 shows the number of observations for dierent groups of DI cases heard
by an ALJ. Column 2 shows the allowance rate at the ALJ stage for that group. Column 3
shows the allowance rate of the group three years after assignment to an ALJ. Columns 2 and
3 show that older individuals, high earners, and those represented by lawyers have relatively
high allowance rates.15 Nevertheless, dierences in allowance rates across subgroups are
15This could be the result of lawyers representing only the most disabled claimants or lawyers causing the allowance
probability to rise. We cannot distinguish between these two hypotheses.
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.0290 22.9 0.0002 0.9
45 to 54 0.0484 37.3 -0.0003 -1.3
55 to 59 0.1379 54.5 -0.0005 -1.0
60 or older 0.1476 49.7 -0.0004 -0.6
Black -0.0497 -23.1 0.0001 0.1
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown -0.0215 -7.0 -0.0001 0.0
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2 0.0082 24.9 0.0000 0.1
Average earnings/1,000,000, years -11 to -2 ($2006) 0.9480 10.2 -0.0002 0.0
Represented by lawyer 0.0743 41.8 0.0008 1.0
SSDI -0.0027 -1.7 -0.0004 -0.6
High school graduate, no college -0.0092 -8.8 0.0000 0.0
Some college -0.0292 -17.3 -0.0010 -1.4
College graduate -0.0127 -5.6 -0.0004 -0.5
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) -0.0124 -4.4 -0.0016 -3.1
Mental disorders -0.0153 -7.7 -0.0016 -2.6
Mental retardation -0.0063 -1.9 -0.0008 -0.8
Nervous system 0.0158 8.6 0.0001 0.2
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 0.0040 2.3 -0.0006 -1.2
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.0036 2.4 0.0000 0.0
Respiratory system -0.0218 -10.3 -0.0006 -1.0
Injuries 0.0098 5.3 0.0009 1.9
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.0215 10.3 -0.0003 -0.5
Standard deviation of dependent variable 0.4293 0.0659
R^2 0.0389 0.0002
Notes: variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned.  Standard errors are clustered by judge. 
Omitted category is male, younger than 45, white, not represented by a lawyer, applying for SSI or SSI and DI 
concurrently, not a high school graduate, with a health condition other than the those listed above.
Sex
Age
Race
Education
Labor force participation and income
Dependent variable: Allowed
TABLE 1:  PREDICTORS OF ALLOWANCE AND JUDGE ALLOWANCE DIFFERENTIAL
Dependent variable: judge 
allowance differential
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Number of applicants = 1,779,825, number of judges = 1,497
Represented by lawyer
Application type
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Observations Allowance rate Allowance Allowance 3 years later Std. Error T-ratio Relative
ALJ stage rate Coeff on judge likelihood*
3 years later allowance rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All groups 1,779,825 0.645 0.769 0.764 0.008 101 1.000
Male 894,927 0.638 0.763 0.738 0.010 74 0.966
Female 884,898 0.652 0.774 0.791 0.009 84 1.035
44 or younger 647,528 0.580 0.698 0.898 0.015 60 1.175
45 to 54 754,191 0.644 0.783 0.752 0.010 74 0.983
55 to 59 245,948 0.755 0.866 0.550 0.016 34 0.720
60 or older 132,158 0.762 0.848 0.612 0.023 26 0.801
White 416,177 0.673 0.791 0.742 0.008 89 0.971
Black 1,154,269 0.586 0.725 0.793 0.015 54 1.037
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 209,379 0.608 0.733 0.835 0.019 44 1.092
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2<70% 688,194 0.581 0.696 0.914 0.013 73 1.197
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2≥70% 1,091,631 0.685 0.814 0.668 0.009 72 0.874
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)<$10000 919,519 0.587 0.709 0.886 0.011 78 1.159
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)≥$10000 860,306 0.707 0.833 0.635 0.011 60 0.831
Represented by lawyer 1,136,584 0.684 0.802 0.738 0.009 79 0.965
Not represented by lawyer 643,241 0.576 0.710 0.802 0.013 62 1.049
SSDI 673,444 0.696 0.814 0.680 0.012 57 0.890
SSI or Concurrent (both SSDI and SSI) 1,106,381 0.614 0.741 0.817 0.010 80 1.069
Less than high school 726,027 0.649 0.776 0.741 0.010 75 0.969
High school graduate, no college 771,339 0.647 0.767 0.778 0.010 76 1.018
Some college 197,533 0.615 0.738 0.812 0.016 51 1.062
College graduate 84,926 0.673 0.786 0.715 0.021 34 0.936
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 34,436 0.644 0.762 0.698 0.036 19 0.914
Mental disorders 272,508 0.591 0.759 0.749 0.018 42 0.980
Mental retardation 31,336 0.602 0.813 0.578 0.034 17 0.756
Nervous system 99,666 0.658 0.776 0.711 0.021 34 0.931
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 191,883 0.670 0.787 0.681 0.015 45 0.891
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 640,712 0.664 0.776 0.785 0.012 68 1.028
Respiratory system 75,079 0.632 0.760 0.757 0.025 31 0.991
Injuries 119,617 0.655 0.748 0.840 0.020 43 1.100
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 86,024 0.661 0.790 0.741 0.022 34 0.970
All other 228,564 0.630 0.740 0.825 0.014 58 1.079
1990 125,293 0.682 0.830 0.549 0.020 28 0.718
1991 145,136 0.717 0.842 0.564 0.016 36 0.739
1992 170,759 0.719 0.829 0.620 0.015 40 0.812
1993 162,315 0.687 0.792 0.736 0.018 40 0.963
1994 179,567 0.659 0.758 0.802 0.018 44 1.050
1995 197,684 0.629 0.738 0.850 0.016 54 1.113
1996 209,342 0.588 0.715 0.872 0.020 44 1.142
1997 197,951 0.589 0.723 0.852 0.017 49 1.115
1998 202,123 0.608 0.745 0.872 0.015 60 1.142
1999 184,045 0.626 0.768 0.775 0.018 43 1.014
Notes: variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned.  Standard errors are clustered by judge. 
*Relative likelihood is the ratio of the group specific coefficient on judge allowance rate (what is in column 4) to the full sample coefficient (0.764).
Year assigned to judge
TABLE 2: ALLOWANCE RATES, BY DEMOGRAPHICS
All groups
Sex
Age
Race
Labor force participation and income
Represented by lawyer
Application type
Education
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
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small.
Column 4 shows the estimated rst stage regression coecient ^3 on the judge allowance
dierential from equation (4). Column 5 shows the standard error and column 6 the t-
statistic. Column 4 shows that the probability of allowance is increasing in the judge allowance
dierential and column 5 shows that the increase is highly statistically signicant for all the
subgroups we consider. The estimated value of ^3 for the full sample is 0.764, meaning that
the probability that case i is allowed 3 years after assignment rises 0.764 percent for every 1
percent increase in the judge allowance dierential (which measures the allowance rate on all
cases other than case i). The main reason ^3 is less than 1 is because we use allowance by the
ALJ as the measure of the judge allowance dierential in table 1, whereas we use allowance
three years after assignment as our key measure of allowance in table 2. Many cases denied
by an ALJ are later allowed.
Column 4 shows that the estimated coecient ^3 is larger for younger individuals, those
with lower labor force participation and earnings prior to appealing, those not represented
by a lawyer, and those whose primary health problem is an injury. Abadie (2003) shows
that the ratio of the group specic estimate of ^3 relative to full sample estimate of ^3 is
informative for understanding the characteristics of those allowed by a small increase in the
ALJ allowance rate. He shows that this ratio yields the relative likelihood that someone
with a given characteristic is allowed given a small increase in the allowance rate. Thus, an
increase in the allowance threshold of all judges would increase the allowance rate of those
with low earnings and injuries more than for other groups, holding the applicant pool and
the rest of the re-applications and appeals process constant.
An important implication of the monotonicity assumption described in section III.A is
that the probability of allowance is non-decreasing in the judge allowance dierential for
all subgroups of the population. If the allowance rate was rising in the judge allowance
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dierential for some subgroups of the population, but was declining for others, it would show
that lenient judges were less likely to allow benets than strict judges for some types of cases.
We do not observe this and thus cannot reject an important implication of the monotonicity
assumption. Furthermore, estimates are highly signicant, so the rank conditions hold.
C. Second Stage: the Eect of Disability Recipiency on Labor Supply
Table 3 presents estimates of the eect of disability recipiency on earnings, labor force
participation (measured as earnings > $100), and an indicator for earnings > the SGA level,
using both OLS and IV estimators. The rst two rows show mean earnings, labor force
participation, and mean earnings > SGA for those allowed and denied benets, three years
after assignment to an ALJ. Row 3 shows the allowance coecient from a regression of
earnings or participation on allowance. Note that the coecient on allowance is just the
dierence in earnings or participation between those allowed and those denied. The next row
shows the associated standard error. The next rows show OLS and IV estimates of de-meaned
(by hearing oce and day) earnings, participation, or earnings > SGA on similarly de-meaned
allowance. The next row includes the covariates listed in table 1: race, sex, age and education
group dummy variables, health (disability category), average earnings and participation prior
to disability, representation by an attorney, and an indicator of concurrent SSDI application.
Parameter estimates are remarkably similar whether using IV or OLS, whether de-meaning
orot, or whether we add additional covariates or not.
Our preferred results are the IV estimates with no covariates. These estimates suggest
that those who are allowed benets earn on average $4,059 per year, are 25.6 percent less
likely to participate, and are 16.1 percent less likely to earn over the SGA level than their
denied counterparts. Adding all the covariates listed in table 1 to this specication has only a
tiny eect on the estimates. For example, adding covariates to the IV participation equation
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Without Covariates:
Allowed 1442 0.130 0.047
Denied 5345 0.395 0.211
Coef on allowance -3903 -0.265 -0.163
(Std. Error) (37) (0.002) (0.001)
Coef on demeaned allowance* -3857 -4059 -0.262 -0.256 -0.163 -0.161
(Std. Error) (34) (140) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005)
With Covariates:
Coef on demeaned allowance* -4247 -4023 -0.271 -0.255 -0.169 -0.161
(Std. Error) (65) (127) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -4688 -0.295 -0.182
(Std. Error) (76) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -3773 -0.253 -0.158
(Std. Error) (34) (0.002) (0.001)
Notes: N=1,779,825.  Standard errors are clustered by judge. Instrument is judge allowance differential.
Earnings, participation, and allowance are measured 3 years after assignment to a judge.
Earnings in 2006 dollars.  Participation is and indicator for earnings over $100 in a year.
Covariates are those in Table 1; they include race, sex, age and education groups, 
health (disability category), average earnings and participation prior to disability, 
representation by an attorney, and an indicator of concurrent SSDI application.
*For de-meaned allowance, all variables are de-meaned from the hearing office-day average.  
 Earnings Participation
TABLE 3: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF DI RECIPIENCY ON LABOR SUPPLY
 Earnings>SGA
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
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changes the estimated participation response from 25.6 percent to 25.5 percent. Recall that
our IV estimation procedure should deliver consistent estimates, with or without covariates.
Thus it is reassuring to see that adding covariates barely changes the estimates.
Perhaps the most surprising fact in table 3 is that OLS and IV estimates are so similar.
In contrast, Chen and van der Klauww (2008) and Maestas, Mullin, and Strand (2011) nd
the OLS estimates are larger than IV. Our IV estimates are larger than those of both Chen
and van der Klauww (2008) and Maestas, Mullin and Strand (2011), although our OLS
estimates are smaller. Our OLS estimates are likely smaller because our initial sample is the
set of individuals who appealed an ALJ decision. These individuals potentially have weaker
attachment to the labor force than the pool of all initial applicants, which is the sample
used in those other two papers. However, for all three papers we are estimating labor supply
responses for the \marginal applicant", whose condition is severe enough that they have a
good chance of allowance, but are not suciently disabled that they are guaranteed allowance
at the initial stage. Thus it should not be particularly surprising that the our IV estimates
are similar to those of Chen and van der Klauww (2008) and Maestas, Mullin and Strand
(2011).
Bound (1989) suggests that OLS should overstate the true work disincentive eect of DI,
because those who are allowed are on average less healthy and thus less likely to work than
those who are not allowed. Dierences in labor supply across the two groups is partly due
to the eect of DI, but also partly due to the fact that those denied benets would be more
likely to work, even if they were allowed. Consistent with this view, table 2 shows that older
individuals have high allowance rates. Tables 4 and 5 show that these individuals are unlikely
to work. Moreover, only 16.2 percent of those allowed benets in our sample die within 10
years, whereas 12.6 percent of those denied benets die within 10 years. However, as pointed
out by Bound (1989, 1991), Parsons (1991), and more recent research, those allowed benets
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have stronger attachment to the labor market prior to applying for benets. It is possible
that this attachment extends to after when they apply for benets. Thus it is possible that
those allowed benets are more likely to work in the absence of benet receipt. This would
imply that OLS understates the work disincentive eect of DI. Consistent with this view,
table 2 shows that those allowed benets have higher earnings and participation prior to
applying. Thus it is an empirical question whether OLS overstates or understates the eect
of DI receipt on participation.
The bottom rows of table 3 present OLS earnings and participation estimates with dierent
sets of additional covariates. The table reveals two osetting biases in the OLS estimates.
Recall the the coecient on allowed when including no covariates is -0.265, but is potentially
biased up or down. OLS potentially understates the eect (i.e., OLS is biased towards 0)
because those allowed benets have stronger prior attachment to the labor market. Thus,
accounting for prior attachment to the labor market should increase the magnitude of the
estimated eect. Consistent with this view, accounting for earnings and participation prior to
appeal, but nothing else, increases the estimated eect from -0.265 to -0.295. OLS potentially
overstates the eect (i.e., OLS is biased towards -1) because those allowed benets are older
and less healthy. Thus accounting for age and health condition should reduce the magnitude
of the eect. Consistent with this view, when we omit labor supply variables, but include all
the other variables listed in table 1, the estimated eect declines from -0.265 to -0.253. Thus
there is evidence for the two osetting eects.
The results in this section are robust to a number of other modications to sample selection
and functional form. Table 4 provides robustness checks for the participation estimates, and
table A3 in the appendix provides further results, including estimates when using earnings.
The rst row of table 4 shows estimates from our benchmark model. The benchmark model
estimates the eect of allowance 3 years after assignment to a judge on participation 3 years
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after assignment. It conditions on a full set of hearing oce-day interactions, drops observa-
tions that are missing education information, and includes those who died in the 3 years after
assignment (and uses allowance status at time of death for allowance and sets participation
to 0 for these individuals). In the second row we include the 123,911 individuals with missing
education. When we do this the estimate for participation rises in magnitude from -0.256
to -0.257. The third row drops both those with missing education (as in the baseline case)
as well as the 49,017 individuals who died within 3 years following assignment (whereas in
the baseline we include those who died, and treat their participation as 0). When we do this
the estimate for participation rises in magnitude to -0.260. The fourth row drops the 47,757
cases where only 1 case was heard at the oce. Given that these observations contribute no
identifying variation, dropping these observations do not change the point estimate relative
to the baseline. The fth row drops the 242,908 cases where only judge heard cases at the
oce on the day of assignment, and nds the same estimate. The sixth and seventh rows use
the baseline sample and condition on a full set of hearing oce-quarter and hearing oce-
year interactions, respectively, rather than a full set of hearing oce-day interactions. These
modications also have little eect on the point estimates.
Table 5 disaggregates the participation responses by demographics, earnings, and health
conditions. Column 1 reports mean earnings for allowed individuals, column 2 for denied
individuals, column 3 the dierence, and column 5 the standard error. Column 5 reports the
IV estimate of allowance on earnings and column 6 the standard error. Table 5 shows that
the eect of DI allowance on participation is relatively small for college graduates and those
with mental disorders, but is larger for high school graduates and those with musculoskeletal
problems and injuries. Participation responses are larger in the late 1990s than the early
1990s and early 2000s (recall that participation is measured three years after assignment,
so assignment in 1999 refers to participation in 2002), potentially giving evidence that the
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Dependent Variable: Participation
Estimate (Std. Error) N
Benchmark specification -0.256 (0.006) 1,779,825
Include those with missing education -0.257 (0.006) 1,903,736
Drop those who died within 3 years after assingment -0.260 (0.006) 1,730,808
Drop observations where only 1 case was heard at the office-day -0.256 (0.006) 1,732,068
Drop cases where only 1 judge heard cases at the office-day -0.256 (0.007) 1,536,917
Condition on hearing office-quarter interactions* -0.257 (0.006) 1,779,825
Condition on hearing office-year interactions* -0.256 (0.006) 1,779,825
*Rather than hearing office-day interactions
TABLE 4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, IV ESTIMATES
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Average participation rate
years -11 to -2 Allowed Denied Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
All groups 0.664 0.130 0.395 -0.265 0.002 -0.256 0.006
Male 0.702 0.133 0.403 -0.270 0.002 -0.263 0.009
Female 0.626 0.127 0.386 -0.260 0.002 -0.250 0.008
45 or younger 0.665 0.174 0.467 -0.293 0.002 -0.290 0.009
45 to 54 0.665 0.116 0.359 -0.244 0.002 -0.254 0.009
55 to 59 0.667 0.094 0.282 -0.189 0.003 -0.248 0.019
60 to 64 0.649 0.099 0.179 -0.080 0.003 -0.069 0.023
Black 0.639 0.138 0.425 -0.287 0.003 -0.252 0.014
White 0.691 0.133 0.393 -0.260 0.002 -0.265 0.008
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 0.561 0.097 0.343 -0.246 0.004 -0.221 0.016
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2<70% 0.312 0.065 0.264 -0.199 0.002 -0.176 0.009
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2ш70% 0.885 0.165 0.531 -0.365 0.002 -0.327 0.012
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)<$10000 0.457 0.087 0.325 -0.239 0.002 -0.202 0.008
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)ш$10000 0.885 0.169 0.525 -0.356 0.002 -0.335 0.014
Represented by lawyer 0.703 0.130 0.400 -0.270 0.002 -0.274 0.008
Not represented by lawyer 0.595 0.129 0.389 -0.260 0.002 -0.226 0.010
SSDI 0.813 0.175 0.429 -0.254 0.002 -0.277 0.016
SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent 0.573 0.100 0.380 -0.280 0.002 -0.244 0.008
Less than high school 0.589 0.076 0.327 -0.251 0.002 -0.230 0.009
High school graduate, no college 0.707 0.148 0.425 -0.277 0.002 -0.279 0.009
Some college 0.732 0.210 0.479 -0.269 0.003 -0.261 0.019
College graduate 0.754 0.254 0.472 -0.219 0.004 -0.179 0.031
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 0.677 0.155 0.457 -0.302 0.006 -0.194 0.043
Mental disorders 0.619 0.146 0.383 -0.237 0.003 -0.202 0.016
Mental retardation 0.576 0.094 0.322 -0.227 0.007 -0.282 0.048
Nervous system 0.667 0.140 0.392 -0.251 0.004 -0.237 0.027
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 0.656 0.111 0.367 -0.256 0.003 -0.250 0.018
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.710 0.136 0.419 -0.283 0.002 -0.285 0.009
Respiratory system 0.619 0.089 0.363 -0.274 0.004 -0.254 0.023
Injuries 0.682 0.147 0.468 -0.320 0.003 -0.367 0.022
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.606 0.089 0.324 -0.235 0.004 -0.224 0.024
All other 0.630 0.128 0.365 -0.237 0.003 -0.211 0.015
1990 0.654 0.100 0.323 -0.223 0.004 -0.234 0.023
1991 0.668 0.108 0.332 -0.224 0.004 -0.186 0.021
1992 0.661 0.115 0.362 -0.247 0.004 -0.277 0.020
1993 0.647 0.123 0.370 -0.246 0.004 -0.231 0.018
1994 0.652 0.137 0.395 -0.259 0.004 -0.293 0.015
1995 0.663 0.142 0.410 -0.268 0.003 -0.276 0.015
1996 0.666 0.141 0.431 -0.289 0.003 -0.273 0.014
1997 0.661 0.147 0.424 -0.277 0.003 -0.252 0.013
1998 0.675 0.140 0.410 -0.270 0.003 -0.265 0.014
1999 0.690 0.134 0.386 -0.252 0.003 -0.222 0.017
Notes: OLS estimates are in levels with no covariates.
IV estimates use demeaned variables and the judge allowance differential as the instrument
Allowance and participation measured 3 years after assignment to an ALJ.  Standard errors clustered by judge.
TABLE 5: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF DI RECIPIENCY ON PARTICIPATION, DISAGGREGATED
OLS IV
Labor force participation and income
Represented by lawyer
Application type
Education
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Year assigned to judge
All groups
Sex
Age
Race
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Average earnings
years -11 to -2 Allowed Denied Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
All groups 15302 1442 5345 -3903 37 -4059 140
Male 19410 1731 6231 -4500 48 -4695 234
Female 11146 1153 4405 -3252 36 -3438 174
45 or younger 12571 2085 6251 -4166 46 -4698 228
45 to 54 16057 1286 5026 -3740 45 -4038 205
55 to 59 18031 872 3728 -2855 69 -3218 427
60 to 64 19286 747 1773 -1026 59 -1496 460
Black 12522 1193 5175 -3982 48 -3675 249
White 17140 1581 5637 -4056 44 -4383 197
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 10690 1100 4431 -3331 67 -3143 381
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2<70% 3445 521 2654 -2132 24 -2025 171
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2ш70% 22776 1937 8124 -6186 51 -5847 287
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)<$10000 3440 578 3025 -2448 23 -2134 165
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)ш$10000 27979 2227 9661 -7434 66 -6888 370
Represented by lawyer 16851 1461 5474 -4013 41 -4431 190
Not represented by lawyer 12563 1402 5189 -3787 47 -3459 239
SSDI 25763 2341 7649 -5307 70 -5787 418
SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent 8934 840 4337 -3497 34 -3138 168
Less than high school 11067 638 3798 -3160 37 -3086 202
High school graduate, no college 16921 1584 5889 -4305 44 -4750 207
Some college 18571 2577 6953 -4375 74 -4077 479
College graduate 29184 4478 9245 -4767 187 -4368 1272
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 16482 2332 6751 -4420 179 -2038 1323
Mental disorders 12032 1350 4607 -3257 57 -2844 318
Mental retardation 9630 545 3120 -2575 107 -2920 1079
Nervous system 15888 1501 5425 -3924 95 -3926 723
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 17462 1178 4823 -3645 67 -3294 385
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 17319 1619 5974 -4355 50 -4942 245
Respiratory system 13468 774 4377 -3603 94 -3177 477
Injuries 15630 2070 7178 -5108 94 -6606 578
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 12272 741 3727 -2986 77 -2589 437
All other 13645 1411 4850 -3439 59 -3634 344
1990 16102 851 4208 -3357 93 -2848 516
1991 16298 1078 4374 -3296 99 -3360 650
1992 15712 1154 4692 -3538 88 -4205 418
1993 14523 1213 4460 -3247 76 -4017 318
1994 14290 1444 4803 -3359 67 -3748 350
1995 14787 1661 5415 -3754 70 -4317 357
1996 15049 1716 5976 -4260 68 -4366 348
1997 15112 1773 6016 -4243 71 -3766 316
1998 15698 1704 5991 -4287 71 -4745 326
1999 16097 1566 5555 -3989 71 -4078 367
Notes: OLS estimates are in levels with no covariates
IV estimates use demeaned variables and the judge allowance differential as the instrument
Allowance and earnings measured 3 years after assignment to an ALJ.  Standard errors clustered by judge.
Earnings in 2006 dollars.
Sex
TABLE 6: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF DI RECIPIENCY ON EARNINGS, DISAGGREGATED 
OLS IV
All groups
Age
Race
Labor force participation and income
Represented by lawyer
Application type
Education
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Year assigned to judge
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work disincentive from DI is larger when it is easier to get a job. For most groups, the
OLS estimates are very close to the IV estimates. One interesting exception is those with
neoplasms. OLS estimates suggest decline in participation of 30.2 percent in response to
allowance, whereas IV suggests a decline of only 19.4 percent. The low responsiveness of
labor supply of those with mental illness is particularly surprising. Mental health is more
dicult to monitor than many other health conditions. As a result, some analysts believe
that many who claim mental illness are those who are healthy and would have worked in the
absence of benet allowance (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). This turns out not to be the
case.
Table 6 disaggregates the earnings responses by demographics, earnings, and health con-
ditions. Results from this table are consistent with the results in table 4. For all groups,
allowance reduces earnings. Earnings estimates tend to be less precise than estimates for
participation, however.
D. Dynamics of the Response
This section shows the dynamics of the response of both earnings and labor force participa-
tion. Figure 3 shows the earnings and participation responses to benet allowance. The top
left panel shows annual earnings for those who are allowed and those who are denied DI ben-
ets by an ALJ both before and after the date of assignment to a judge. Prior to assignment,
those who are allowed benets have higher earnings than their denied counterparts. By the
year of assignment, earnings for allowed and denied individuals are similar. Three years after
assignment, earnings of those allowed benets average $1,490 while earnings of those denied
average $3,842, a dierence of $2,352. Dierences in earnings between those allowed and
those denied emerge rapidly, are very stable 2-5 years after assignment, and decline slowly
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE THE EFFECT OF DISABILITY INSURANCE RECEIPT ON LABOR SUPPLY 33
thereafter.16
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
in
 2
00
6 
do
lla
rs
Earnings OLS
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
in
 2
00
6 
do
lla
rs
Earnings IV
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
Participation OLS
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
Participation IV
Denied by ALJ Allowed by ALJ
Figure 3. : Dynamics of earnings and participation, allowed versus denied by ALJ.
Consistent with the evidence on earnings, the bottom-left panel of gure 3 shows that 10
years prior to assignment, those who are subsequently allowed benets have participation
rates that are seven percentage points higher than those subsequently denied benets. Three
years after the date of assignment, those who are allowed benets have participation rates
that are 17 percentage points lower than those who are denied. Afterwards, the dierences
16Some care must be taken in interpreting the decline in earnings of denied individuals 5 years after assignment
because after 5 years, 7 percent of all sample members are at least 65 and after 10 years 21 percent are at least 65.
These people are eligible for full Social Security benets, even if they were initially denied.
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between the two groups narrow slightly.
The right-hand panels show IV estimates of earnings and labor force participation of allowed
and denied individuals both before and after assignment to a judge. We estimate the eect of
allowance for each year relative to the assignment year, as predicted by the judge allowance
dierential. Using the estimation procedure described in section III.B we can estimate the
eect of DI receipt on earnings or participation at any point in time (at least for those
aected by the instrument). The vertical dierence between the allowed and denied lines is
this estimated eect. In order to make the gures more concrete, we also present the level
of earnings and participation. To identify the level, we make the additional assumption that
E[i ] for those aected by the instrument is the same as E[i ] for those not aected by the
instrument: see appendix D for details. This assumption is untestable, although section V.F
gives evidence that E[i] does not vary much over the support of our data.
17
IV estimates for those allowed versus denied are virtually identical prior to assignment.
Recall that the dierence in participation between the two groups is that predicted by the
instrument of the judge allowance dierential. A dierence of 0 prior to assignment is a reas-
suring result, as it shows that we are unable to predict labor supply prior to assignment using
our instrument. This is an important testable implication of the independence assumption.
However, after assignment, earnings and participation of allowed individuals are lower. The
top right panel shows that three years after the time of assignment, the dierence in earnings
between the two groups is $2,314 (virtually identical to the OLS estimate) and remains very
stable thereafter. Similarly, the bottom right panel shows that three years after assignment
the dierence in participation between the two groups is 14.8 percent, and does not change
much thereafter. The standard errors are tiny and thus omitted. For example, the standard
17In contrast to our ndings, Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2011) do nd variability in E[i ] across the support of
their data.
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error on the eect of allowance on participation averages less than 1 percent when using either
OLS or IV.
Note that the IV estimate of the eect of allowance on earnings 3 years after allowance is
smaller in gure 3 ($2,314) than in table 3 ($4,059). The dierence arises because gure 3
uses allowance by the ALJ, whereas table 3 uses allowance 3 years after assignment to the
ALJ. Section V.E discusses the dierence between allowance by an ALJ and allowance at any
point in time.
E. Appeals, Re-applications, and Subsequent Allowance
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Figure 4. : Allowance and Appeals/Re-applications following denial by ALJ.
The left panel of gure 4 shows the share of denied (at the ALJ stage) individuals who are
reapplying/appealing and allowed relative to when they are assigned to a judge.18 It shows
18We use data from ACAPS and LOTS to identify denied applicants who successfully appealed at either the Appeals
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that 35 percent of all applicants denied by an ALJ were allowed benets within three years.
Furthermore, many initially denied individuals continue to reapply or appeal for many years
after their initial denial. Three years after assignment to an ALJ, 40 percent of all individuals
denied benets are still in the process of appealing or reapplying for benets. Combined, fully
75 percent of those denied by an ALJ are either allowed or in the process of appealing 3 years
after assignment to an ALJ.
The right panel of gure 4 presents the share of initially denied individuals who are allowed
benets or are still in the process of reapplying/appealing relative to when they are assigned
to a judge, where the shares are instrumented using the judge allowance dierential. To do
this we estimate the eect of predicted ALJ allowance on allowance and appeals at future
points in time, as well as the procedure in appendix to D to infer the eect of ALJ denial
on future allowance.19 Thus the left panel uses OLS and the right panel uses IV, where
initial denial is instrumented using the judge allowance dierential. Those aected by the
instrument are likely the marginal cases who have a better chance of nal allowance than
others denied benets. For this reason we might think that subsequent allowance rates of
those initially denied would be higher when instrumented. In fact, this is the case, although
the OLS estimates and the IV estimates are similar. For example, the right panel gure 4
shows that for those initially denied benets, the IV estimate of allowance is 42 percent three
years after assignment, versus 35 percent from the OLS estimates.
Sections V.D and V.E show that most denied applicants do not work, but engage in re-
applications and appeals until they get DI benets. This has an important eect on our main
Council or the Federal Court level. We use data from SSA 831 les, MBR (Master Beneciary Record), and SSR
(Supplemental Security Record) to identify denied applicants who reapplied for benets and were allowed at either the
DDS, Reconsideration, ALJ, Appeals, or Federal Court level stage.
19Using the full sample, we regress de-meaned allowance on a set of wave dummies and predicted de-meaned ALJ al-
lowance  wave dummies (where allowance is predicted using the judge allowance dierential). The estimated coecient
on allowancewave measures increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial denial. Next, we
regress de-meaned appeal on a set of wave dummies and predicted de-meaned ALJ allowance interacted with wave dum-
mies (where allowance is predicted using the judge allowance dierential). The estimated coecient on allowancewave
measures increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial denial. The right panel of gure 4
plots the coecient on predicted allowancewave for both the allowance and appeal equations.
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estimated eects. Table 3 shows that DI benet allowance reduces earnings $4,059 per year
when measuring earnings and allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ. However, DI
benet allowance reduces earnings $4,915 per year when measuring earnings and allowance
ve years after assignment to an ALJ.
F. Estimates of the Distribution of Labor Supply, Allowance, and Appeal Responses: Marginal
Treatment Eects
Using the the Marginal Treatment Eects approach described in section III.C and appendix
C, this section shows how DI benet allowance aects the distribution of labor supply, sub-
sequent allowance, and appeals.
−
50
00
−
45
00
−
40
00
−
35
00
−
30
00
−
25
00
Ea
rn
in
gs
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1
Predicted Demeaned Allowance 
−
.
3
−
.
28
−
.
26
−
.
24
−
.
22
−
.
2
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1
Predicted Demeaned Allowance
Estimated Marginal Treatment Effect MTE, plus 2 SE MTE, minus 2 SE
Figure 5. : Earnings and participation decline when allowed for marginal applicant.
The left panel of gure 5 shows the earnings decline and the right panel shows the partici-
pation decline of the marginal case when allowed (i.e., the Marginal Treatment Eect). We
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use third order polynomials for both the instrument and the endogenous variable (de-meaned
allowance) when estimating equations (7) and (8). Both Akaike's information criterion and
the Bayesian information criterion reject quadratic and quartic specications in favor of the
cubic. Furthermore, results from the quartic specication are very similar to the cubic speci-
cation. Since polynomial smoothers have poor endpoint properties, we show estimated MTEs
over the middle 90 percent of the distribution of the judge allowance dierential. Based upon
Monte Carlo experiments, we found our procedure produced little bias over the middle 90
percent of the distribution. Figure 5 also shows bootstrapped 95 percent condence intervals.
On average, annual earnings and participation decline $4,300 and 26 percent in response
to benet allowance, similar to the main estimates reported in table 3. However, there is
heterogeneity in the declines. The earnings decline is $3,451 for the marginal applicant heard
by an ALJ who is stricter than 95 percent of all judges, whose decisions lead to allowance
rates that are nine percentage points below the average three years after assignment. The
earnings decline is $4,131 for the marginal applicant heard by an ALJ who is more lenient
than 95 percent of all judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates that are eight percentage
points above the average three years after assignment. When judge specic allowance rates
rise, the labor supply response of the marginal case also rises. This result is consistent with
the notion that as allowance rates rise, more healthy individuals are allowed benets. These
healthier individuals are more likely to work when not receiving DI benets and thus their
labor supply response to DI receipt is greater. Nevertheless, the dierences in the earnings
response are not statistically signicant and is modest in size.
Figure 6 shows how allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ aects allowance 10
years afterwards. It shows that 40 percent of those not allowed three years after assignment
were allowed benets 10 years after assignment. For marginal applicants assigned to lenient
judges and are not allowed three years after assignment, the probability of allowance 10
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Figure 6. : Marginal applicant's allowance probability 10 years after assignment conditional on not al-
lowed 3 years after assignment to an ALJ.
years after assignment is .38. For those assigned to strict ones it is .42. Recall that marginal
applicants assigned to lenient judges and not allowed benets are healthier than those assigned
to strict judges. Thus it is unsurprising that they are less likely to be allowed benets in
the future. What is remarkable, however, is that conditional on being denied 3 years after
assignment, 40 percent have been allowed benets 10 years after assignment.
G. Elasticity of Labor Supply with Respect to the After-Tax Wage
In this section we present estimates of the eect of DI on the after-tax (and after DI benet)
wage, as well as the earnings and participation elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage 3
years after assignment to an ALJ. Table 7 shows participation and earnings elasticities with
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respect to the after-tax wage, which we calculate as follows:
"y;w =
(E[yijAi = 0]  E[yijAi = 1])=(E[yijAi = 0] + E[yijAi = 1])
(E[wijAi = 0]  E[wijAi = 1])=(E[wijAi = 0] + E[wijAi = 1])(10)
where E[yijAi = 0] is the average outcome variable (either mean earnings or participation) of
denied individuals and E[yijAi = 1] is the average outcome variable for allowed individuals.
E[wijAi = 0] is the average after-tax wage for denied individuals and E[wijAi = 1] is the
average after-tax wage for allowed individuals. The after-tax wage is dened as the income
gain from wage earnings plus SSI and DI benets (net of federal, state and payroll taxes)
when working. Appendix B presents the details of how we estimate after-tax wages.
We rst predict the distribution of pre-tax wages for everyone in the sample using data
on pre-tax wages for those working 3 years after assignment to an ALJ. The rst row of
table 6 shows that the average predicted pre-tax wage of workers in our sample is $11,047.
Next, we use Social Security earnings histories, the year, and state of residence to calculate
DI/SSI benets for everyone in the sample. The second row shows that the average DI/SSI
benet is $9,023. The third row shows the DI/SSI benet reduction resulting from high
earnings. People who are allowed benets will lose most of their benets if they work. The
fourth column shows that the average Federal, State, and payroll tax paid by those working
is $2,081. The fth row is after-tax income, which is labor income plus the DI/SSI benet,
less DI/SSI reductions and taxes. The sixth row shows the average after-tax wage, dened
as the dierence between the after-tax income if working and the after-tax income if not
working. The after-tax wage is $8,966 on average for those who are denied benets and
is $4,599 for those allowed benets. Because most DI beneciaries who are working earn
above the SGA level, most people who are allowed benets will lose their DI benet if they
work. Thus, most of the gain from working is lost when the individual has been allowed
DI benets. We take estimates of earnings and participation declines when allowed (i.e.,
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working not working working not working
Pre Tax Wage Income 11,047 0 11,047 0
DI/SSI benefit if Allowed 9,525 9,525 0 0
DI/SSI benefit reduction 4,572 0 0 0
Taxes 2,081 0 2,081
After Tax Income* 13,915 9,525 8,966 0
After Tax  Wage**
Earnings 1.86
Participation 1.53
Notes: Earnings and Participation estimates are from Table 3.  2006 dollars.
Elasticity is an arc elasticity: see equation (10)
*After Tax Income is sum of pre-tax wage income and DI/SSI benefit, less DI/SSI benefit reduction and taxes
**After tax wage = after tax income if working - after tax income if not working
TABLE 7: EARNINGS AND PARTICIPATION ELASTICITIES
Means
Allowed versus 
Denied  Percent 
Change/100  
Elasticity
Elasticity
Allowed Denied
0.135 0.391 0.98
4,390 8,966 0.64
1,412 5,471 1.19
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E[yijAi = 0]   E[yijAi = 1]) from table 4 and use the procedure in section D to infer
E[yijAi = 1] and E[yijAi = 0]. Table 6 shows that the implied earnings elasticity is 1.9
and participation elasticity is 1.5. While our estimates suggest that most DI/SSI applicants
would not work even if denied benets, labor supply is elastic for this group of individuals.
In order to infer a labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage from the
labor supply response to DI allowance, we make two strong assumptions. First, we assume
that individuals are only responding to current work incentives and not future incentives.
However, individuals must keep their earnings below the SGA level in order to appeal or
reapply for benets. Therefore, the low earnings level of denied applicants may be caused
by the incentives to keep earnings low in order to appeal or to reapply for benets. Thus
we are overstating the percent dierence in the present value of future after-tax wages and
understating the labor supply elasticity. To better assess this issue, we measure the labor
supply response to allowance ve years after allowance. Figures 1 and 3 show that after ve
years most DI/SSI applicants have either received benets or have given up on the application
process. Five years after assignment to an ALJ, the participation elasticity is 1.6, slightly
higher than the elasticity three years after assignment.
Second, we omit the value of health insurance benets from both work and from DI/SSI
receipt. When individuals lose their DI and SSI benets due to high earnings, they sometimes
lose their Medicare and Medicaid health insurance benets.20 Thus the percent change in
the after-tax wage is likely larger and the true labor supply elasticity is smaller than what
we report in table 6. As such, our two strong assumptions lead to two potentially important,
but osetting, biases. Interestingly, our estimates are similar to those of Kostl and Mogstad
20The rules determining health insurance eligibility are complex. Since the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act, Medicare continues for many years after benets are rst suspended for work. The SSI 1619(b) work
incentive allows SSI recipients to maintain SSI and Medicaid eligibility when their earnings are well above the point
where SSI benets are zero. Most states now have Medicaid buy-in programs that allow individuals who work despite
disabilities that meet DI/SSI medical criteria to pay a sliding scale premium for Medicaid benets.
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(2012). They exploit a Norwegian reform whereby DI recipients would be allowed to retain
more of their earnings if they returned to work. While Kostl and Mogstad's approach
is dierent than ours, the similarity of results reinforces the view that labor supply of DI
applicants is elastic.
VI. Conclusion
This paper estimates the eect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. Using
instrumental variables procedures, we address the fact that those allowed benets are a se-
lected sample. We nd that benet receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage
points three years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller
for those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. OLS estimates are
similar to instrumental variables estimates. The participation elasticity with respect to the
after-tax wage is 1.5. Over 60 percent of those denied benets are allowed benets within 10
years, showing that most applicants apply, re-apply, and appeal until they get benets.
Our ndings have important policy implications. First, we nd that a signicant minor-
ity of DI applicants can work. Since current the current disability rules strongly discourage
work, policy proposals to encourage the disabled to work (both through smaller work disin-
centives and through better services and support) should receive greater attention. Second,
we nd that the work disincentive eects vary with socio-economic characteristics and types
of impairments. In order to allow pro-work reforms to be fully eective, these reforms must
consider the heterogeneity of disability beneciaries and replace the 'one-size-ts-all' policy
with an 'individualized' program that targets subgroup of beneciaries. For example, younger
applicants have larger labor supply responses than older applicants. Thus programs focusing
on getting relatively young beneciaries back to work are likely to be more successful than
programs focusing on getting older beneciaries back to work.
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Appendix A: Data Appendix
We use the universe of all DI appeals heard by ALJs, 1990-1999. We use data from the
Oce of Hearings and Appeals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing Oce Tracking
System (HOTS), the Appeals Council Automated Processing System (ACAPS), the Litigation
Overview Tracking System (LOTS), the SSA 831 le, SSA Master Earnings le (MEF), the
Master Beneciary Record (MBR), the Supplemental Security Record (SSR), and the SSA
Numerical Identication (NUMIDENT) le.
The OHACCS data contain details of Social Security DI and SSI cases adjudicated at the
ALJ level (and also contain limited information on cases heard at the Appeals Council, Federal
or Supreme Court). In addition to SSI and DI, they include cases involving Retirement and
Survivors Insurance as well as Medicare Hospital insurance. We keep only the SSI and DI
cases. The OHACCS data are used for administering DI and SSI cases, and are thus very
accurate. The OHACCS data include information on the judge assigned to the case, the
hearing oce, the date of assignment, and the outcome of the case (such as allowed or
denied). It also has data on the claimant's Social Security number, and type of claim (DI
versus SSI). The data include all cases led in 1982 to present. Because our earnings data go
back to 1980, and we use earnings data 10 years prior to assignment, we use OHACCS data
1990-2009.
Until 2004, individual hearing oces maintained their own data, called the Hearing Oce
Tracking System (HOTS). These data were then uploaded to the OHACCS system. We
found some missing cases in the OHACCS system. These are apparently the result of HOTS
data not being properly uploaded. The problem occurs in about 1 percent of all cases. For
these cases we augment the OHACCS data with HOTS. After 2004, all uploading of data is
automatic, and thus there are no problems with missing data.
OHACCS also contains Appeals Council records. However, data on Appeals Council de-
cisions are sometimes missing from OHACCS. Thus we use the Appeals Council Automated
Processing System (ACAPS) data to track actions on cases heard at the Appeals Council
level. ACAPS is the Appeals Council's data for administration of cases.
The Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS) data are used for administration of
cases that are heard at the Federal or Supreme Court level. These data provide information
on which cases that were denied at the Appeals Council level were appealed at the Federal
Court level. We combine the LOTS data with information provided by the Federal Court to
determine whether the cases was eventually allowed or denied.
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The SSA 831 data have information on the details of the DI application received at the
Disability Determination Service. The data include information on the type of application
(whether DI or SSI or concurrent) and whether the claim is on one's own earnings history or
on the history of a spouse or parent. It also has all the information relevant for determining
whether the application should be allowed, either through a medical listing or the vocational
grid. Thus we have detailed medical information, such as the health condition of the indi-
vidual. Because of the vocational grid, we have information on age, education, industry and
occupation. We also have some other demographic information such as sex. Since a new 831
record is established whenever a new application is led and adjudicated, we use information
in the 831 le to identify those who reapplied for benets.
The Master Earning File (MEF) includes annual longitudinal earnings data for the US
population. It includes not only individuals' annual Social Security covered earnings from
1951 to the present (which we use to calculate the Primary Insurance Amount for DI benets),
but also individuals' annual wages directly taken from the W-2 starting from 1978. We use
data back to 1981. Wage earnings are not top-coded, but self-employment earnings are top
coded until 1992. Our earnings measure is the sum of wage earnings and self employment
earnings, which we topcode at $200,000 per year.
The Master Beneciary Record (MBR) includes beneciary and payment history data
for OASDI program. The Supplemental Security Record (SSR) contains information on
individuals applying for SSI benets. We use the MBR and SSR to identify disability benet
award status of individuals.
Lastly, we use the SSA NUMIDENT for information on date of death. The NUMIDENT
le includes information from the Social Security Number application form such as name,
date of birth and Social Security number. Once the individual dies, the date of death is
placed on the le. We treat individuals who die as missing, although we found that this
assumption does not aect our results.
For Figure 1 and A1 we use all cases led 1989-1999. We include all primary disability {
auxiliary benet claimants (i.e., child and spouse) are excluded. We make no other sample
restrictions for these cases. For all other gures and tables, we begin with the universe of all
cases adjudicated by an ALJ and make the following sample restrictions, described in Table
A1:
1) We drop all Medicare cases. These Medicare cases are typically disputes over whether
Medicare will pay for certain medical treatments.
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2) We drop all remand cases (cases sent to Appeals Council, then sent back to the hearing
oce). We drop these because this would lead to double counting of cases, as a remand
is a case that was already heard by an ALJ.
3) We drop cases with a missing Social Security number. This leaves us with 3,525,787
cases for 1990-1999.
4) We drop all cases younger than 35 or older than 64.
5) We drop cases with missing judge or hearing oce information.
6) We drop cases that were previewed prior to being assigned to a judge. These cases are
extremely likely to be critical cases that are reviewed by a senior attorney.
7) We drop cases where the claim is against the earnings record of a spouse or parent.
8) We drop cases with missing education data. This leaves us with 1,779,825 cases.
Table A2 presents sample means.
Re-applications and appeals
Figure A1 uses the same data as in gure 1 shows the total share of initial claims allowed
at any level. It also disaggregates those cases not allowed into those where the application
process ended versus those who were re-applying or appealing a denial. 10 years after the
initial ling, 67 percent of all claimants were allowed benets, 27 percent were denied and the
process ended, and 6 percent were still in the process of applying for benets. Together, gures
1 and A1 emphasize the fact that re-applications and appeals are important for understanding
the DI system.
Appendix B: Additional Results
Conditioning on Hearing Oce and Quarter or Year Instead of Day
In this appendix we show additional results, conditioning on hearing oce and quarter,
then hearing oce and year rather than hearing oce and day. As we pointed out earlier,
conditioning on hearing oce and day means that we must include many additional covariates.
Conditioning on hearing oce and quarter or hearing oce and year are more parsimonious
specications. Table A3 shows evidence on the extent to which we can predict the judge
allowance dierential when conditioning on hearing oce and day, hearing oce and quarter,
and hearing oce and year. As such, it generalizes table 1 of the paper. It shows that there
is more evidence against random assignment when conditioning on hearing oce and year
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Sample size
Original sample 3,525,787
Number of drops
(1): Age at assignment <35 or  >64 792,939
(2): Missing judge or hearing office information 174
(3): case is pre-viewed 794,470
(4): DI Child case 30,221
(5): Survivor case 3,564
(6): Missing education data 123,911
(7): Judge handled fewer than 50 cases 683             
total number of sample dropped (sum of drops 1-7) 1,745,962
Remaining sample 1,779,825
TABLE A1: SAMPLE SELECTION
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Female 0.497
45 or younger 0.364
45 to 54 0.424
55 to 59 0.138
60 to 64 0.074
Black 0.234
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 0.118
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2≥70% 0.922
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)≥$10000 0.483
Not represented by lawyer 0.639
SSDI (not SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent) 0.378
Less than high school 0.408
High school graduate, no college 0.433
Some college 0.111
College graduate 0.048
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 0.128
Mental disorders 0.019
Mental retardation 0.153
Nervous system 0.018
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 0.056
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.108
Respiratory system 0.360
Injuries 0.042
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.067
All other 0.048
1990 0.070
1991 0.082
1992 0.096
1993 0.091
1994 0.101
1995 0.111
1996 0.118
1997 0.112
1998 0.114
1999 0.104
Allowance by ALJ 0.645
Allowance 3 years after assignment to an ALJ 0.769
Participation 3 years after assignment to an ALJ 0.191
Earnings 3 years after assignment to an ALJ 2345
N=1,779,825
TABLE A2: MEANS
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Year assigned to judge
Age
Race
Labor force participation and income
Education
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Figure A1: Share of all DI/SSI applicants who are allowed benefits, are
applying/appealing, and share who are denied, no longer re-applying or
appealing
than hearing oce and day, although estimates are similar whether using hearing oce and
day or hearing oce and quarter or hearing oce and year. For example, when t  statistic
for the coecient on injuries is 1.9 when conditioning on hearing oce  day interactions,
but is 2.3 when conditioning on hearing oce quarter and 2.4 when conditioning on hearing
oce  year. For this reason we condition on hearing oce and day for the main analysis,
but show estimates when conditioning on hearing oce and quarter and hearing oce and
year in this appendix.
Next, we show our main estimates, conditioning on both hearing oce and quarter and
also hearing oce and year. We focus on participation and earnings. The top panel of Table
A4 shows results when conditioning on hearing oce  day interactions, and is the same
specication as table 3 of the main text. The middle panel shows results when conditioning on
hearing oce  quarter interactions, and the bottom panel shows results when conditioning
on hearing oce  year interactions. Comparing the three panels shows that conditioning
on hearing oce  quarter or hearing oce  year instead of hearing oce  day has little
eect on the estimates.
Disaggregation by Age Groups
In Tables 5 and 6 of the paper we estimated eects for dierent age groupings. Figures A2
and A3 show the underlying labor supply, appeal allowance outcomes for those both ages 40-
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0002 0.9 0.0002 0.8 0.0002 0.8
45 to 54 -0.0003 -1.3 -0.0003 -1.4 -0.0003 -1.3
55 to 59 -0.0005 -1.0 -0.0003 -0.6 -0.0004 -0.7
60 or older -0.0004 -0.6 -0.0003 -0.4 -0.0003 -0.4
Black 0.0001 0.1 -0.0001 -0.1 -0.0001 -0.1
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown -0.0001 0.0 -0.0003 -0.1 -0.0003 -0.2
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2 0.0000 0.1 0.0000 0.2 0.0000 0.2
Average earnings/1,000,000, years -11 to -2 ($2006) -0.0002 0.0 -0.0044 -0.4 -0.0057 -0.5
Represented by lawyer 0.0008 1.0 0.0010 1.1 0.0010 1.0
SSDI -0.0004 -0.6 -0.0003 -0.3 -0.0003 -0.3
High school graduate, no college 0.0000 0.0 0.0000 -0.1 -0.0001 -0.1
Some college -0.0010 -1.4 -0.0010 -1.3 -0.0011 -1.3
College graduate -0.0004 -0.5 -0.0006 -0.7 -0.0006 -0.7
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) -0.0016 -3.1 -0.0021 -3.7 -0.0021 -3.6
Mental disorders -0.0016 -2.6 -0.0019 -2.9 -0.0020 -2.9
Mental retardation -0.0008 -0.8 -0.0006 -0.5 -0.0006 -0.5
Nervous system 0.0001 0.2 -0.0002 -0.4 -0.0002 -0.4
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) -0.0006 -1.2 -0.0007 -1.2 -0.0007 -1.2
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.0000 0.0 0.0001 0.2 0.0001 0.2
Respiratory system -0.0006 -1.0 -0.0006 -0.9 -0.0006 -0.9
Injuries 0.0009 1.9 0.0012 2.3 0.0013 2.4
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) -0.0003 -0.5 -0.0002 -0.5 -0.0003 -0.5
Standard deviation of dependent variable 0.0659 0.0633 0.0653
R^2 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
Notes: variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned.  Standard errors are clustered by judge. 
Omitted category is male, younger than 45, white, not represented by a lawyer, applying for SSI or 
SSI and DI concurrently, not a high school graduate, with a health condition other than those listed above.
TABLE A3:  PREDICTORS OF JUDGE ALLOWANCE DIFFERENTIAL, CONDITIONAL ON DAY, QUARTER, AND YEAR
Number of applicants = 1,779,825, number of judges = 1,497
Labor force participation and income
Represented by lawyer
Application type
Education
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Sex
Age
Race
judge allowance 
differential (de-
meaned by hearing 
office and quarter)
judge allowance 
differential (de-
meaned by hearing 
office and year)
judge allowance 
differential (de-
meaned by hearing 
office and day)
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OLS IV OLS IV
Without Covariates:
Coef on allowance -3903 -0.265
(Std. Error) (37) (0.002)
Coef on demeaned allowance* -3857 -4059 -0.262 -0.256
(Std. Error) (34) (140) (0.002) (0.006)
With Covariates:
Coef on demeaned allowance* -4247 -4023 -0.271 -0.255
(Std. Error) (65) (127) (0.002) (0.005)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -4688 -0.295
(Std. Error) (76) (0.002)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -3773 -0.253
(Std. Error) (34) (0.002)
OLS IV OLS IV
Without Covariates:
Coef on allowance -3903 -0.265
(Std. Error) (37) (0.002)
Coef on demeaned allowance* -3837 -4113 -0.261 -0.257
(Std. Error) (34) (126) (0.002) (0.006)
With Covariates:
Coef on demeaned allowance* -4229 -4028 -0.270 -0.255
(Std. Error) (64) (116) (0.002) (0.005)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -4688 -0.295
(Std. Error) (76) (0.002)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -3773 -0.253
(Std. Error) (34) (0.002)
OLS IV OLS IV
Without Covariates:
Coef on allowance -3903 -0.265
(Std. Error) (37) (0.002)
Coef on demeaned allowance* -3833 -4104 -0.261 -0.256
(Std. Error) (34) (128) (0.002) (0.006)
With Covariates:
Coef on demeaned allowance* -4223 -4002 -0.270 -0.254
(Std. Error) (64) (119) (0.002) (0.005)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -4688 -0.295
(Std. Error) (76) (0.002)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
Coef on allowance -3773 -0.253
(Std. Error) (34) (0.002)
Notes: N=1,779,825.  Standard errors are clustered by judge. Instrument is judge allowance differential.
Earnings, participation, and allowance are measured 3 years after assignment to a judge.
Earnings in 2006 dollars. Participation is an indicator for earnings over $100 in a year.
Covariates are those in Table 1; they include race, sex, age and education groups, health (disability category), average
earnings, and participation prior to disability, representation by an attorney, and an indicator of concurrent SSDI application
*For de-meaned allowance, all variables are de-meaned from the hearing office-day, quarter or year average.  
TABLE A4: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF DI RECIPIENCY ON LABOR SUPPLY
 Earnings Participation
Conditioning on hearing office-day interactions
 Earnings Participation
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 Earnings
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Participation
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
Conditioning on hearing office-year interactions
Conditioning on hearing office-quarter interactions
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44 and also 50-54. The top 4 panels of gure A2 shows estimated earnings and participation
responses to allowance by an ALJ, both using OLS and IV, for those ages 40-44. The bottom
four panels show the same responses for those ages 50-54. Figure A2 shows that prior to
assignment, the two age groups have similar participation rates, although those aged 50-54
have somewhat higher earnings. Following assignment, those denied benets are much more
likely to return to work if they are in the 40-44 year old age group: 36 percent are working
3 years after assignment versus only 24 percent among those ages 50-54. The IV estimates
are similar to the OLS estimates. Figure A3 shows that part of the reason that younger
individuals are more likely to return to work is that they are less likely to be allowed benets:
3 years after assignment 29 percent of those aged 40-44 at time of assignment were allowed,
versus 42 percent for those ages 50-54 were allowed. Figure A3 also shows that among those
ages 40-44, 15 percent are still appealing or re-applying for benets 10 years after assignment,
and 54 percent have been allowed benets.
Appendix C: Derivations
Marginal Treatment Eects
All derivations in this are purely for completeness { they are straightforward adaptations
of that discussed in Heckman et al. (2006) or French and Taber (2011). Dene Ai as a 0-1
indicator =1 if individual i is allowed benets, yi is earnings, participation, appeals, or future
allowance. We drop t subscripts for simplicity. Individual i's earnings are characterized by
yi =
8><>:y1i if Ai = 1y0i if Ai = 0(11)
where
y1i = +Xiy + u1i(12)
y0i = Xiy + ui
Combining equations (11) and (12) yields:
yi = Aii +Xiy + ui:(13)
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE THE EFFECT OF DISABILITY INSURANCE RECEIPT ON LABOR SUPPLY 55
Ages 40-44
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
in
 2
00
6 
do
lla
rs
Earnings OLS
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
in
 2
00
6 
do
lla
rs
Earnings IV
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
Participation OLS
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
Participation IV
Denied by ALJ Allowed by ALJ
Ages 50-54
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
in
 2
00
6 
do
lla
rs
Earnings OLS
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
in
 2
00
6 
do
lla
rs
Earnings IV
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
Participation OLS
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−10 −5 0 5 10
years after assignment date
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
ra
te
Participation IV
Denied by ALJ Allowed by ALJ
Figure A2: Dynamics of earnings and participation, allowed versus denied by
ALJ. Top panels: ages 40-44. Bottom panels: ages 50-54.
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Figure A3: Allowance and Appeals/Re-applications following denial by ALJ,
ages 40-44 and 50-54.
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where i = + u1i   ui. Allowance is determined by
Ai = 1fg(Zi)  Vi > 0g(14)
where 1f:g is the indicator function, Zi = (ji;Xi), and ji represents a full set of judge dummy
variables. By assumption, ui and i are potentially correlated with each other but Vi is
independent of ji and Xi. The Marginal Treatment Eect is
MTE(Xi = x; Vi = p)  E[y1i   y0ijXi = x; Vi = p](15)
where P (Zi)  Pr(Ai = 1jZi). Given equation (12), MTE(Xi = x; Vi = p) = + u1i   u0i =
i. Using equation (13), we estimate the conditional expectation function
E[yijXi = x; P (Zi) = p] = E[Aii +Xiy + uijXi = x; P (Zi) = p]
= E[Ai(+ u1i   ui)jXi = x; P (Zi) = p] +Xiy + E[uijXi = x; P (Zi) = p]
= E[AijXi = x; P (Zi) = p] + E[(u1i   ui)jAi = 1;Xi = x; P (Zi) = p]p
+XiA + E[uijXi = x; P (Zi) = p](16)
where the step E[Ai(u1i   ui)jXi = x; P (Zi) = p] = E[(u1i   ui)jAi = 1;Xi = x; P (Zi) =
p] Pr[Ai = 1jXi = x; P (Zi) = p] follows from the Law of Total Probability, and noting that
Pr[Ai = 1jXi = x; P (Zi) = p] = p. Continuing with the simplications, and noting that we
have already assumed that u1i; ui are independent of Xi we have:
E[yijXi = x; P (Zi) = p] = p+ E[(u1i   ui)jAi = 1; P (Zi) = p] +XiA + E[uijP (Zi) = p]
= XiA + p+ E[(u1i   ui)jAi = 1; P (Zi) = p]p+ E[uijP (Zi) = p]
= XiA +K(p)(17)
where K(p)  p + E[(u1i   ui)jAi = 1; P (Zi) = p]p + E[uijP (Zi) = p]. Dierentiating
equation (17) with respect to p yields
@E[yijXi = x; P (Zi) = p]
@p
= K 0(p)(18)
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This derivative is equal to the Marginal Treatment Eect. To see this, note that as a nor-
malization we can let the distribution of Vi be uniform [0; 1], so
@E[yijXi = x; P (Zi) = p]
@p
=
@
 R p
0 E[y1ijXi = x; Vi = p] +
R 1
p E[y0ijXi = x; Vi = p]

@p
= E[y1ijXi = x; Vi = p]  E[y0ijXi = x; Vi = p]
 MTE(Xi = x; Vi = p):(19)
Thus estimation of equation (17) and taking K 0(p) yields the MTE. In the text we refer to
P (Zi) as the plim of bAi.
Demeaning the data
We have 217,663 hearing oce-day interactions as covariates, so directly estimating equa-
tions (1) and (2) is not computationally feasible. To simplify the problem we de-mean the
data. Specically, we take the dierence between Ait, and yi and the means of the same
variables heard at the same hearing oce and same day.21 For example, when estimating the
MTE we estimate equations (20) and (21):
eAit = KX
k=1
kt(eji^1; i)k + it;(20)
eyi = KX
k=1
'k
^
(
beAit)k + i(21)
where \e" represents a de-meaned variable, e.g., eAit = Ait  Ait and Ait is the mean allowance
rate at the hearing oce and on the day that case i was assigned andeji^1; i = ji^1; i  ji^1; i
and ji^1; i is the mean value of ji^1; i at the hearing oce and on the day that case i was
assigned. We use polynomials when estimating marginal treatment eects because poly-
nomials are straightforward to demean. We choose the order of polynomial K that mini-
mizes Akaike's information criterion, ln ^2 + 2K=N and the Bayesian information criterion,
ln(^2) +K=N  ln(N). Because of the well known endpoint problems with polynomials, we
experimented with the order of the polynomial. We found that the results were largely
unchanged when we increased or decreased the order of the polynomial by 1.
21This is equivalent to taking residuals from rst stage regressions of Ait, yit on Xi.
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The instrument is ji^1 from the equation
Ai1 = ji^1 +XiA1 + ei1(22)
implies
E[As1jXs] = E[js^1jXs] +XsA1(23)
for any given s and so
E[js^1   E[js^1jXs]] = E[As1  E[As1jXs]](24)
where the left-hand side object is E[js^1   E[js^1jXs]], the de-meaned instrumental vari-
able. We approximate the right-hand side object, but using the sample analog and leaving
observation i out, as in a jackknife estimator, so the constructed instrument is:
eji^1; i = 1Nj   1 X
s2J;s 6=i
As1  As1(25)
where Nj is the number of cases heard by judge ji over the sample period, J is the set of cases
heard by judge ji, As1 is the mean allowance rate by ALJs at case s's hearing oce on the
day case s was heard. Doyle (2007) uses a similar approach. Because we remove case i fromeji^1; i, as in a jackknife estimator, it should be independent of i and i, even in a small
sample.
Based on Monte Carlo experiments with what seemed reasonable parameters, the procedure
produced accurate approximations in the linear models, as well as for the true MTE from the
10th to 90th percentiles of the distribution of the estimated judge allowance dierentials, so
we present estimates of the MTE over the middle 80 percent of the data.
Appendix D: Using IV estimates to identify the eect of ALJ allowance on the level of
labor supply, future allowance, and appeals
Level of labor supply
The plim of the IV estimator is E[yi jAit = 1]   E[yi jAit = 0] where yi is an outcome
measure (participation, earnings, allowance or appeals) at time  and Ait is an indicator
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equal to 1 if the individual was allowed at time t.
First we describe identication of the eect of ALJ allowance on the level of labor supply.
The estimation procedure described in section III.B identies the change in earnings or par-
ticipation caused by DI receipt. To obtain the level, note that the law of total probability
gives
E[yi ] = E[yi jAit = 1]Pr[Ait = 1] + E[yi jAit = 0]Pr[Ait = 0]:(26)
Furthermore, equation (2) shows that
E[i ] = E[yi jAit = 1]  E[yi jAit = 0]:(27)
Using equations (26) and (27) we can solve for the two unknowns:
E[yi jAit = 1] = E[yi ] + E[i ] Pr[Ait = 1](28)
E[yi jAit = 0] = E[yi ]  E[i ] Pr[Ait = 0]:(29)
We can identify E[yi ], Pr[Ait = 1];Pr[Ait = 0] directly from the data. Our estimation
procedure delivers E[i ] for cases who are aected by our instrument. Assuming that E[it]
for those aected by the instrument is the same as E[it] for those not aected by the
instrument yields estimates of E[yi jAit = 1] and E[yi jAit = 0] for the full sample. This
assumption is untestable, although section V.F gives evidence that E[i ] does not vary much
over the support of our data.
Future Allowance and Appeals
Next we describe identication of time t allowance on the level of future allowance and
appeals. To do this we estimate equation (2), or in de-meaned form, equation (5), where
the left hand side variable is time  allowance Ai or appeals ai and the coecient on time
t allowance converges to E[i ] for the set of individuals aected by the instrument. The
regression coecient identies E[i ] = E[Ai jAit = 1] E[Ai jAit = 0]. Because allowance is
a binary variable, and because allowance is an absorbing state, E[Ai jAit = 1] = prob[Ai =
1jAit = 1] = 1. Thus the regression coecient identies
E[Ai jAit = 1]  E[Ai jAit = 0] = 1  prob[Ai = 1jAit = 0](30)
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and so prob[Ai = 1jAit = 0] = 1  E[i ].
When considering appeals dene ai as an indicator equal to 1 if the individual was ap-
pealing at time  . Then
E[ai jAit = 1]  E[ai jAit = 0] = 0  E[ai jAit = 0]
=  prob[ai = 1jAit = 0](31)
and so prob[Ai = 1jAit = 0] =  E[i ] where E[i ] is the plim of the regression coecient
on the appeals equation.
Appendix E: Calculation of the After-Tax Wage
We estimate after-tax wages as follows. We impute pre-tax wage income of non-working
DI applicants using a predictive mean matching regression approach, described in David et
al. (1986). We rst regress income y on the vector of observable variables m described in
table 1, yielding y = mb+ #. Second, for each sample member i we calculate the predicted
value y^i = mib^, and for each member with an observed value of yi we calculate the residual
#^i = yi   y^i. Third, we sort the predicted value y^i into deciles. Fourth, for non-working
individuals, we impute #i by nding a random individual j with a value of y^j in the same
decile as y^i, and setting #i = #^j . The imputed value of yi is y^i + #^j . We estimate models
for DI and SSI beneciaries separately because the two groups face dierent labor supply
incentives.
Once we impute pre-tax wage income for every member of the sample, we calculate the
after-tax wage. First, we use year, state, and the Social Security earnings data to calculate
the DI/SSI benet for everyone in the sample. We impute SSI benets using state and year
for those drawing SSI benets. Second, we predict the distribution of post-tax wages plus
DI benets (i.e., the dierence between income if working and income if not working) for
everyone in our data using the federal, state, and local tax schedule shown in French and
Jones (2011). Those who are allowed benets will have DI benets if predicted income from
working is below the SGA limit ($6,000 in 1993 to $9,360 in 2002). If income is above the
SGA limit, then the individual will lose benets. If the individual is denied benets, then
there are no DI benets to be lost when working. We assume that SSI benets above the
disregard level are reduced 50 cents for each dollar of earnings, until all SSI benets are
lost. Third, we take the sample average after-tax wage if denied and allowed, which is our
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measure of E[wijAi = 0] and E[wijAi = 1]. Our main limitation on these measurements is
that ideally we should know family structure and all sources of income to calculate taxes.
Family structure is important because the DI/SSI benet depends on marital status and the
number of dependants. Unfortunately, we do not have this information, so we assume that
the individual can claim no dependants for the DI/SSI benet and is not pushed into a higher
marginal tax bracket from spousal or other non-labor income.
